0001090506.pdf	2
	Anchor 2	5
	Anchor 3	6
	0001090474.pdf	10
	Naturalized Phenomenology	11
	Husserl’s Anti-naturalism	12
	Transcendental Philosophy and Philosophical Psychology	15
	Philosophical Naturalism	22
	References	25
	0001090475.pdf	28
	Phenomenology and Non-reductionist Cognitive Science	28
	Introspection and Beyond	29
	Neurophenomenology	31
	Front-Loading Phenomenology	33
	Chaminade and Decety (2002)	36
	Farrer and Frith (2002)	37
	Farrer et al. (2003)	38
	Conclusion	39
	References	40
	0001090476.pdf	42
	A Toolbox of Phenomenological Methods	42
	‘Phenomenology’: One Term – Many Meanings	42
	Phenomenology – Just ‘a Way of Seeing’?	44
	Spiegelberg’s Account of Phenomenological Method as a Series of Steps	46
	Phenomenological Methods as a Toolbox – Complementing Spiegelberg’s Steps	51
	Naturalization of Phenomenology – a Conciliatory Proposal	58
	References	61
	0001090477.pdf	63
	Towards a Formalism for Expressing Structures of Consciousness	63
	Towards a Formalism for Philosophical Phenomenology	67
	An Application to Scientific Studies of Consciousness	79
	References	86
	0001090478.pdf	88
	Consciousness	89
	The Natural Attitude	89
	The Pull of Objectivity	92
	Consciousness as Empirical and as Transcendental	94
	The Intentional Core of Experience	95
	Intentionality, Body, and World	97
	Conclusion	101
	References	101
	0001090479.pdf	102
	Attention in Context	102
	A Gestalt-Phenomenology of Attention	103
	The Context Problem in Attention Research	104
	Connecting Context to Focus	106
	Achieving the Bigger Picture in Cognitive Science of Attention: Attention-in-Context-with-Margin	110
	Dynamic Attention: Context Transformations, Theme Replacements, Attentional Capture	112
	Context Transformations	112
	Theme Replacements	114
	Attentional Capture	116
	Conclusion	117
	References	119
	0001090480.pdf	125
	The Phenomenology and Neurobiology of Moods and Emotions	125
	Introduction	125
	Damasio and Solomon on Emotion	125
	Heidegger on Moods and Emotions	129
	The Phenomenology of Feeling	131
	Horizons and Bodily Dispositions	137
	Conclusion	140
	References	141
	0001090481.pdf	143
	Phenomenology, Imagination and Interdisciplinary Research	143
	Introduction: Staking Out the Field	143
	Imagination in Phenomenology	144
	Imagination in Interdisciplinary Research	148
	Conclusion	155
	References	155
	0001090482.pdf	161
	The Function of Weak Phantasy in Perception and Thinking	161
	Weak Phantasmata in Perception	163
	Phantasmatic, Non-linguistic Modes of Thinking in Humans and Animals	170
	References	178
	0001090483.pdf	180
	Myself with No Body? Body, Bodily-Consciousness and Self-consciousness	181
	A Certain Unity	181
	Four Irreducible Bodily Dimensions	182
	The Body-As-Object	187
	The Body-As-Subject	188
	Being a Bodily Subject Out of One’s Body	191
	(De)constructing One’s Bodily-Self	194
	Conclusion	197
	References	198
	0001090484.pdf	201
	A Husserlian, Neurophenomenologic Approach to Embodiment	201
	A Description of Lived Experience	201
	One’s Own Body	203
	Multi-sensorial Integration Through the Act	206
	Transforming the Subjective into the Objective	208
	The Hand Touching and Touched	210
	Summary	213
	References	214
	0001090485.pdf	217
	Body and Movement: Basic Dynamic Principles	217
	Introduction	217
	Embodiment	219
	Kinesthesia and Fundamental Human Concepts	221
	Coordination Dynamics: Learning One’s Body and Learning to Move Oneself	225
	Evolutionary Biology and the Existential Fit of Leib and Körper	227
	References	231
	0001090486.pdf	235
	Empirical and Phenomenological Studies of Embodied Cognition	235
	Empirical Studies of Embodied Cognition and the Spectres of Crypto-Cartesianism	236
	Mind Is Body: Movement, Time and the Prejudice of Presence	242
	Body Is Mind: Bringing the Zombie to Leib	247
	Conclusion	248
	References	249
	0001090487.pdf	253
	The Problem of Other Minds	254
	Introduction	254
	The Reality of the Problem of Other Minds	255
	Conservative Responses to the Problem	256
	Reductive Responses to the Problem	260
	Phenomenological Responses to the Problem	261
	Concluding Remarks	266
	References	266
	0001090488.pdf	268
	Mutual Gaze and Intersubjectivity1	268
	Mindsight	268
	Double Sight	273
	Concluding Remarks	279
	References	280
	0001090489.pdf	282
	Knowing Other People’s Mental States as if They Were One’s Own	282
	First-Person Perspective	283
	The Limits of Empathy	286
	Reconstructive and Mirror Empathy	287
	Condition of Isomorphism	288
	Condition of Immediacy	290
	The Limits of Motor Resonance	292
	Condition of Isomorphism	293
	Condition of Immediacy	294
	Conclusion	296
	References	296
	0001090490.pdf	299
	Intersubjectivity, Cognition, and Language	299
	Conditions for Description of Mental or Internal States	301
	The Intersubjectivity of Public and Personal Knowledge and Experiences	304
	Conditions for Distinguishing What Is Publicly Observable from What Is Not	307
	Implications of the Logical Relation Between the Notion of “Truth” and “Others”: the Impossibility of Private Cognition and La	310
	What It Means That Our Notion of “Truth” Is Fundamentally Social	311
	Consequences for Developmental Psychology: Conclusion	312
	References	314
	0001090491.pdf	315
	The Problem of Representation	316
	How Things Look	316
	Encountering Entities	318
	Agents and Their Parts	320
	Action-Oriented Representation	322
	The Frame Problem	325
	Concluding Remarks	331
	References	332
	0001090492.pdf	334
	Action and Agency	334
	Action and Agency	334
	Notions of Agency	336
	Experience of Agency	338
	The Primitivist Conception	339
	The Complex Conception	341
	Vision and Agency	345
	Concluding Remarks: The Illusion of Agency	347
	References	348
	0001090493.pdf	352
	Meaning, World and the Second Person1	352
	The “Conscious Brain”	353
	The Consciousness-World Correlation	356
	The Sensorimotor Emergence of the World	359
	The Shared World	361
	References	363
	0001090494.pdf	364
	Husserl and Language	365
	Preamble: Language and Husserl	365
	Structure in Language and Function of Language	366
	First Logical Investigation: the Ontology of Language Use	369
	Intimation	369
	The Meaning Conferring Acts	370
	The Meaning-Fulfilling Acts	374
	Partial Conclusion	375
	The Semantic-Syntactical Duality of the Fourth Logical Investigation	377
	The Syntactic A Priori	378
	The Semantic-Mereological A Priori: What Governs the Configuration of Partial Meanings into Signifying Wholes?	382
	Language and Conceptual Structure – Evidence from Cognitive Linguistics	388
	Len Talmy’s Closed Class Semantics	388
	Fillmore’s Frame Semantics	390
	Grammatical Specification of Perceptual Intentionality	391
	Conclusion	393
	References	394
	0001090495.pdf	396
	Metaphor and Cognition	396
	The Traditional View of Metaphor	396
	Metaphor as Irreducible Cognitive Process	397
	Challenges to Metaphorical Meaning	400
	Metaphor as Conceptual and Conventional	401
	The Moving Times Metaphor	402
	Metaphor and Cognitive Neuroscience	406
	References	408
	0001090496.pdf	410
	Phenomenology and Cognitive Linguistics	410
	Introduction	410
	Fundamental Issues: “Experientialism” Versus Phenomenology	412
	Metaphysics	413
	Methodology: Phenomenological and “Empirical” Methods	416
	Intersubjectivity	420
	Embodiment	422
	Summary	426
	Phenomenological Influences	427
	Representation and Sign	427
	Image Schemas	429
	Construal	431
	Conclusion	433
	References	434
	0001090497.pdf	439
	The Role of Phenomenology in Psychophysics1	440
	Fechner and the Birth of Psychophysics	441
	Developments Since Fechner	444
	What Does Outer Psychophysics Measure?	445
	Not Just Intensities Anymore	449
	A More Radical Concern: Laming’s Challenge	451
	Philosophical Assessment of Laming’s Challenge	459
	References	461
	0001090498.pdf	463
	A Neurophenomenological Study of Epileptic Seizure Anticipation	463
	Introduction	463
	Context of the Project	464
	The Neurophenomenological Program	464
	The Anticipation of Epileptic Seizures	464
	Neuro-Dynamic Analysis of Seizure Anticipation	465
	Pheno-Dynamic Analysis of Seizure Anticipation	467
	Context	467
	Collecting Descriptions of the Preictal Period	469
	Initializing the Interview	469
	Main Difficulties	470
	Choosing a Singular Seizure and the Start of the Description	470
	Evoking the Preictal Period	471
	Describing the Various Dimensions of the Preictal Experience	472
	Analysing and Comparing the Descriptions	475
	An Example of Neurophenomenological Circulation	476
	Pheno-Dynamic Structure of Preictal Experience	476
	Countermeasures	478
	Articulating Pheno-Dynamic and Neuro-Dynamic Structures	478
	Search for a Temporal Coincidence	478
	Search for a Structural Correspondence and Working Hypothesis	479
	Consequences and Lines of Research	479
	Therapeutic Consequence: A Cognitive Therapy of Epilepsy	479
	Epistemological Implications: The Question of the “Gap”	481
	Searching for Homeomorphisms	482
	The Rythmic and Transmodal Dimension of Lived Experience	484
	Questions of Co-Constitution	486
	Towards the Origins of the Gap	488
	Conclusion	488
	References	489
	0001090499.pdf	492
	How Unconscious is Subliminal Perception?	492
	Short Biographical Sketch of Subliminal Perception	493
	The First Subliminal Wave – Perception is Not Just Stimulus-Related	493
	Discredit of Subjective Methods – Towards Objective Measures	495
	Exhaustiveness of Subjective Methods	495
	Exclusiveness of Subjective Methods	496
	Discredit of Subjective and Objective Methods – Focus on Processing	497
	Absence of Evidence	497
	The Development of the Definition of Subliminal Perception	499
	The Second Subliminal Wave – What About Subjective Reports?	499
	Objective and Subjective Measures, and What TheyCan Tell Us About Subliminal	502
	Why We Need More Than Objective Measures	502
	Why We Need a Continuous Subjective Measure – The Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS)	504
	The Status of Subliminal Perception	506
	0001090500.pdf	510
	IW – “The Man Who Lost His Body”1	510
	Introduction	510
	The Study of Gesture and Its Implications	512
	The Gesture Continuum	512
	Gestures and Speech – Two Simultaneous Modes of Semiosis	513
	The Binding of Speech and Gesture	514
	IW’s gestures	515
	Significant Variables in Assessing IW’s Gesture Performance	516
	IW’s Gestures With and Without Vision (1997)	516
	Topokinetic Versus Morphokinetic Accuracy	518
	Instrumental Actions	519
	Significance of the IW Results So Far	520
	IW Can Control Speech and Gesture in Tandem (1997)	520
	Summary of IW’s Gestures Without Vision	523
	Phantom Limb Gestures	523
	Overall Significance of the IW Case	524
	Conclusion: Growth Points, Material Carriers, and Inhabitance	524
	The Growth Point	524
	Material Carriers	526
	Phenomenology and the Scientific Study of Gesture	528
	To Sum Up	532
	References	533
	0001090501.pdf	535
	Phenomenology and Psychopathology	536
	Introduction	536
	Dimensions of Self-experience	538
	Disturbances of Embodiment	540
	Disturbances of the Subject-Body	541
	Schizophrenia as a Disembodiment	541
	Melancholic Depression as “Hyperembodiment”	543
	Disturbances of the Body-Image (Object-Body)	544
	Body Dysmorphic Disorder	545
	Anorexia Nervosa	545
	Disturbances of Temporality	547
	Disturbances of Basic Temporality	548
	Disturbances of Autobiographical (Explicit) Temporality	549
	Disturbances of Intersubjectivity	550
	Disturbances of Primary Intersubjectivity in Autism	552
	Disturbances of Secondary Intersubjectivity in Schizophrenia	553
	Conclusion	555
	References	557
	0001090502.pdf	563
	Delusional Atmosphere and Delusional Belief	563
	Introduction	563
	The Capgras and Cotard Delusions	564
	Affect and Experience	566
	Delusional Atmosphere	568
	Nothingness	574
	Conclusion	575
	References	577
	0001090503.pdf	579
	Autoscopy: Disrupted Self in Neuropsychiatric Disorders and Anomalous Conscious States	579
	Background: Self and Neuropsychiatric Disorders	579
	Classification of Autoscopy	580
	The Four Types	580
	Type I Autoscopy: The Other Is Like Me	581
	Type II Autoscopy: I Am Like the Other	582
	Out of Body Experience (OBE): The Splitting of “I” and Me	586
	Feeling of a Shadowy Presence (FOP): I am Confronted by Another “I”	589
	Phenomenological Approaches to Autoscopy	594
	The Other Is Like Me, I Am Like the Other(s)	597
	Mirroring as Self-alienation	599
	Turn-Taking with Others and with Myself	600
	Body Schema/Body Image: Reversible Reference Frames Mediate Self-other Relationship	602
	The Illusion of Self-Movement in OBEs: A Comparison of Theories	604
	Perception-Action Cycle and Self-Other Relationship	607
	Dissociating Mind and Subjectivity	608
	Metaphor as Symbolic Self-transcendence in Autoscopy	610
	Do the Neuroanatomical Correlates of Autoscopy Support the Phenomenological Theory?	611
	Conclusions	615
	References	617
	0001090504.pdf	623
	Phenomenology as Description and as Explanation: The Case of Schizophrenia	623
	Introduction	623
	Description and Explanation, Motivation and Causation	624
	Disturbed Ipseity: A Phenomenolgical Account of Schizophrenia	627
	Explanatory Relevance of the Mental or Subjective Domain: Preliminary Considerations	629
	Synchronic Relationships	632
	Equiprimordial Relationships16	632
	Constitutive Relationships	633
	Expressive Relationships	634
	Conclusion: Phenomenological Implication	635
	The Diachronic Dimension	635
	Primary Hyperreflexivity	636
	Consequential Hyperreflexivity	636
	Compensatory Hyperreflexivity	637
	Conclusion: Phenomenological Causality	638
	Conclusion	640
	References	640
	0001090505.pdf	643
	Agency with Impairments of Movement	643
	Beginnings	643
	Empirical Observations on Will and Action Awareness	644
	Immediate Perceptions of Paralysis and Inaction	646
	Agency After Pure Sensory Loss	647
	Forgetting How To	649
	Agency in Paralysis	650
	Effort After the Loss of Automatic Action	652
	Agency with Altered or Reduced Embodiment	652
	Affect and Inaction	653
	The Communicative and Emotional Self in Action and Inaction	654
	Conclusions	656
	References	657
	Schmicking_Index.pdf	659